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Abstract  
The development of complex systems involves a multi-tier supply-chain, with each 
organisation allocated a reliability target for their sub-system or component part 
apportioned from system requirements. Agreements about targets are made early in the 
system lifecycle when considerable uncertainty exists about the design detail and 
potential failure modes. Hence resources required to achieve reliability are 
unpredictable. Some types of contracts, such as service level agreements, provide 
incentives for organisations to negotiate targets so that system reliability requirements 
are met, but at minimum cost to the supply chain. This paper proposes a mechanism for 
deriving a fair price for trading reliability targets between suppliers using information 
gained about potential failure modes through development and the costs of activities 
required to generate such information.  The approach is based upon Shapley’s value and 
is illustrated through examples for a particular reliability growth model, and associated 
empirical cost model, developed for problems motivated by the aerospace industry. The 
paper aims to demonstrate the feasibility of the method and discuss how it could be 
extended to other reliability allocation models. 
 
Keywords: reliability allocation; reliability targets; supply chain; reliability growth 
model; Pareto optimality; Shapley value 
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1.  Introduction 
The design, development, manufacture, delivery and service of complex systems 
are fulfilled by many organisations within a supply chain. Aerospace is one industry 
where prime contractors and system integrators lead co-ordination of the value-chain 
where, according to [29], approximately 70% of the final value of the aircraft is 
outsourced. A five tier model represents the aerospace supply chain [2] with the first tier 
corresponding to the prime contractors. The second to fourth tiers involve large and 
medium sized manufacturers with responsibility for sub-systems, major components 
and structural parts. The fifth tier comprises small companies and sub-contractors 
specialising in materials, manufacturing, processes, software and services.  
The aerospace industry is interesting because its supply chain contains dedicated 
sub-system suppliers serving a relatively narrow market. In relation to other 
manufacturing industries, aerospace production volume is low; product lifecycles and 
lead times between projects are long; investment in research, development and unit 
manufacturing costs are high; largely due to certification. The relatively small number 
of sub-system suppliers at upper levels of the chain combined with the highly 
specialised small-to-medium sized enterprises within the lower levels of the chain, 
means prime contractors are highly dependent on developing long-term relationships 
with suppliers and this has implications for the management of reliability in the light of 
emergent changes in organisational structures and processes [23]. 
 Currently, the prime contractor translates customer reliability requirements into 
appropriate targets for the system then allocates these targets across sub-systems. This is 
repeated down the supply chain. Reliability targets may be expressed as, for example, 
failure free operating times, failure rate or mean time between specified events, such as 
failure, replacement or overhaul. To assure targets are met, each organisation 
 3
implements a programme of reliability activities that aim to uncover potential failure 
modes and/or to prove its product design.  The activities may include, for example, 
failure mode and effects analysis, fault tree analysis, physics of failure, reliability 
enhancement testing. It is not unreasonable to expect the cost of a reliability programme 
to depend upon the target and the current level of knowledge about the inherent system 
reliability. For example, the higher the target levels and lower the knowledge about 
product heritage then the greater investment needed in the reliability programme.  
 There is no evidence that organisations within a supply chain work together 
rationally to re-negotiate targets in the light of information fedback from observations 
obtained through implementation of reliability activities. In part this may be due to lack 
of contractual incentives. For example, contracts that differentiate payment for product 
delivery and operational support provide no incentive for reliability improvement since 
profit can be generated through spares provisioning.  In contrast, service level contracts 
[2] do incentivise the supplier to minimise operational failure rate since non-availability 
represents a cost. Further, such contracts imply the customer does not have to micro-
manage the reliability programme, or administer repair, and suppliers must be given 
freedom to modify systems to improve reliability. 
 This paper describes a method to support trading of reliability targets across a 
supply-chain by minimising the cost of the combined suppliers reliability programmes 
in the light of information generated from implementation of activities in each, under 
the constraint that the system reliability target is to be met. To achieve this requires a 
means of trading reliability targets between organisations. We assume this is feasible 
during long project gestations for complex systems because different sub-systems and 
parts will intentionally evolve over different horizons hence the opportunity to review 
information and costs at multiple decision points is available.  Section 2 positions the 
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proposed approach in relation to the existing literature in reliability allocation, hence 
establishing the gap in knowledge that this paper seeks to fill.  A criterion for measuring 
the value of exchanging reliability targets within a supply chain based upon game 
theoretic arguments is proposed and section 3 shows how the model can be developed 
into a framework for trade within the supply chain by examining a mechanism for 
deriving a fair price for transferring reliability targets between suppliers. Section 4 
presents an example to illustrate use of the method. Conclusions and suggestions for 
further work are presented in Section 5. 
 
2. Summary Review of Reliability Allocation Literature 
Reliability requirements are regarded by [5] as ‘the overall needs of the user and define 
the objectives for the product’, while [18] believes they ‘define the problems that the 
designer must overcome’. Both are valid although assume differing perspectives: the 
customer and the technology respectively. Guidance about the precise specification of 
requirements given in [18] proposes that they should: define failure in relation to the 
system function; provide full descriptions of the environments in which the system will 
be stored, transported, operated and maintained; and state failure modes, and effects, 
which are critical and therefore must have a very low probability of occurrence which 
can be subject to verification.  
 Reliability targets will be generated from requirements and are typically higher 
than those specified to compensate for uncertainties and shortfalls in measurement. 
Reliability targets contribute to the portfolio of constraints, which includes 
functionality, cost and time, bounding the design solution space. Reliability allocation is 
the process of apportioning the system target to lower indenture levels in relation to the 
design architecture. This permits sub-contractors to work to relevant targets for sub-
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systems and parts; permits evaluation of achieving requirements; and allows designers 
to understand relationships between parts, sub-system and system reliability as well as 
the relationship between reliability and other system characteristics. 
 Methods for allocation range from apportioning reliability equally across sub-
systems to assign targets based on importance criteria, feasibility or historical data [4]. 
All make similar assumptions. For example each sub-system has a constant failure rate 
and fails independently of others; hence each sub-system is assigned a percentage of the 
system failure rate. The AGREE method [1] assumes a series system comprising 
identical sub-systems and assigns each equal failure rates. The ARINC method [27] also 
assumes a series system but computes weights in proportion to sub-system failure rate 
where the latter are estimated from historical data. The feasibility of objectives method 
[9] weights sub-system failure rates as a function of factors, such as complexity of sub-
system design, where such factors may be assessed using subjective expert judgement.  
Regardless of the approach taken, reliability allocation provides an input to a 
decision support model which can help engineers determine an optimal system design 
where reliability is a constraint and choices are made about component selection, 
configuration and level of redundancy. Numerous optimisation algorithms exist. [4] 
give examples where technical, or economic, measures are optimised subject to 
specified constraints. A comprehensive review of optimisation in system reliability is 
given in [15].  Typically, one decision maker is assumed and models are constructed to 
determine an optimal design as a one off decision. An exception being [6] who explore 
Pareto optimal sets for system reliability optimisation when uncertainty exists within the 
component reliabilities. Research effort has tended towards efficient and effective 
algorithms. While mathematical programming approaches are useful, they provide little 
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insight into the manner in which reliability targets are sequentially traded off against 
costs and negotiated across the system. 
 The extent to which cost is captured in allocation models varies.  Typically 
continuous parametric cost functions are assumed. For example, [11,12] model 
hardware reliability costs for system task allocation, assuming linear cost functions. [8] 
propose three criteria for cost functions used in reliability optimisation: it should be 
positive definite; non-decreasing; and increase rapidly as reliability approaches 1. They 
develop a generic cost model as an exponential function of the inverse of the system 
reliability. However, as argued in [10], continuous costs functions are not always 
appropriate as decisions are discrete and alternatives are finite. This will be particularly 
true when design choices are few. Hence there is a need for further consideration of 
discrete cost functions. 
 This review has reported models to support engineers allocate reliability across 
the system but no models have been identified for the stated management problem of 
allocation and trade of reliability targets within the supply chain. Hence the 
development of a method to support trading, given that the system design uncertainty 
will change through development, should contribute to the literature. This paper also 
addresses some specific shortcomings of the existing literature by developing, for 
example, discrete cost functions empirically, which has relevance to other resource 
allocation models.  
 
3 Method for Trading Reliability Targets 
 The proposed method to facilitate transfer of reliability targets between 
organisations in a supply-chain is based upon game theoretic principles and is first 
developed at a conceptual level for the simplest case of a set of two suppliers before 
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extension to a more general solution.  The underlying assumptions are stated in section 
3.1. Section 3.2 illustrates the basic principles and discusses the characteristics of 
optimal exchange of targets. Section 3.3 presents the general solution. 
 
3.1 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are required in order to develop the method.  The 
assumptions have been informed by both our understanding of industry practice as well 
as elements of game theory. 
 
1. Customer reliability requirements are stated and fixed for the system. 
2. Contractual obligations between suppliers and the customer are agreed prior to the 
start of the reliability programme. 
3. The supply chain is defined by the organisations that provide sub-systems and 
parts with measurable reliability targets for integration into the system (the 
suppliers) as well as the system integrator (the prime supplier). 
4. There exist contractual incentives for the supply chain to meet reliability targets at 
minimum cost. 
5. The target reliability of the prime supplier is a function of the target reliabilities of 
all sub-suppliers in the chain and the reliability of the system integration; 
6. There are multiple decision-makers; one within each organisation within the 
supply chain. 
7. There are multiple decision points corresponding to time points within the system 
project plan at which reliability is assessed and can be re-negotiated; 
8. Target reliabilities can be traded-off between suppliers such that the system 
reliability target is met at the minimum cost to the supply chain. 
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9. Cost is measured as the investment in resources for the activities conducted within 
the reliability programmes of the suppliers. 
10. Each organisation uses a model that explicates the relationship between the 
reliability of the product design and the reliability activities to which it can be 
exposed. 
 
Most of the assumptions are self-explanatory. For example, assumptions 1 through 9 are 
dependent upon the industry context hence their validity can only be assessed for a 
given problem.   Assumption 10 requires that each organisation within the supply chain 
should be using a model to estimate reliability through development and to select the 
optimal portfolio of activities in formulating their initial reliability programme.  [13] 
propose such a reliability growth model and show how Bayesian updating can be 
performed for an individual organisation. This model is implemented for the examples 
presented in this paper and its salient properties will be explained as required.  
 
3.2 Edgeworth Box and Pareto Optimality for a Two-Supplier Chain 
 A simple example is used to illustrate the basic principles of the trading model.  
Consider a simple chain consisting of two suppliers, each contributing a component 
part. In addition to the aforementioned assumptions in section 3.1, assume each part has 
a constant failure rate and the system failure rate is the sum of the two part failure rates 
since the system requires the parts to operate in series.  
First let us consider one supplier. Conceptually, the expected cost of their 
reliability programme will be negatively related to the level of the target failure rate.  
Note that failure rate is used simply as one example of a reliability indicator for 
illustration. The approach is not constrained to a failure rate, although the diagrams 
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require adaptation to reflect the appropriate direction of the relationship.  For example, 
the cost would be positively related to probability of successful operation for a specified 
duration. 
The trade-off between cost and revenue from performance will translate to a 
profit for the system. If profit is the only criterion to be satisfied, then the supplier will 
be indifferent to the trade-offs between programme costs and failure rate for fixed profit 
which is represented by points on a profit curve. Figure 1 illustrates these so-called 
indifference curves and shows that as profit levels increase, the curves shift to the right. 
For illustration the indifference curve is drawn as a smooth continuous function, 
although in practice, the curve will comprise a series of discrete points [10] but will 
have the characteristic of being monotonically non-decreasing.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
Each supplier will have an indifference curve for each fixed profit level. For the case of 
two suppliers an Edgeworth box [26] can be constructed, as shown in Figure 2. This 
represents the superposition of the indifference curves of the two suppliers from their 
respective origins in the bottom left hand vertex (supplier A) and top right hand vertex 
(supplier B), for fixed profit levels, either 1PA  or 2PA  for supplier A or 1PB or 2PB for 
supplier B. The vertical axis of the box corresponds to the total expected reliability 
programme costs for the system, which is the sum of the costs for the two suppliers, 
while the system failure rate is plotted on the horizontal axis and is the sum of the 
failure rates of the component parts. 
 Figure 2(a) illustrates a target failure rate and associated cost for supplier A 
denoted by ( )1 1,A Acµ and for supplier B denoted by ( )1 1,B Bcµ .  Measuring these from 
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their respective origins so that ( )1 1,A Acµ = ( )1 1,B Bcµ , the box can be partitioned 
according to the contribution of the two suppliers to the system failure rate and costs.  
Any point in the box represents an allocation of costs and failure rate, whereby the 
combined costs and failure rate remain constant.  Note not all points may be feasible 
given the discrete nature of cost as a function of reliability. The current allocation of 
reliability targets is sub-optimal, since moving to the right along indifference curve 1PB , 
for example, would result in an improved allocation.  This is because at the current 
allocation of reliability targets, a marginal increase in the failure rate for A, say SA1µ , 
compensated by a decrease in the failure for B, to SB1µ , will result in a reduction in total 
costs since 1111 BASBSA cccc +<+ . See, for example, Figure 2(b). The vertical difference 
between the two indifference curves at any particular allocation of the failure rate 
represents the reduction in combined cost.  The shaded area between these curves 
represents improved allocations because at least one of the suppliers would be on a 
higher profit curve without changing the combined costs and failure rates.  However, 
there is no guarantee that a feasible allocation exists within the shaded area.   
Figure 2(c) represents another possible allocation of the failure rate.  Again this 
leads to cost savings, which if divided between supplier A and B can be conceptualised 
as each having indifference curves with a greater profit level, denoted by 2PA and 2PB  
respectively. This allocation is optimal in a sense, since the characteristic of both 
indifference curves are tangent to one another, representing equivalence in the marginal 
rates of substitution between costs and failure rate at the point ( ) ( )2222 ,, BBAA cc µµ = .  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
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While all allocations within the shaded region area in Figure 2(a) are 
improvements over the initial allocation, they are not all optimal. Multiple optimal 
solutions may exist for this re-allocation problem and can be found using mathematical 
programming assuming data are available to construct a total cost model.    
Sharing benefits from cost reduction between suppliers requires their 
cooperation and therefore depends on bargaining between both parties.  The concept of 
Pareto optimality characterises efficient allocations within Edgeworth boxes, such as 
those presented in Figure 2, and hence informs bargaining. An allocation is considered 
Pareto optimal if there does not exist an alternative allocation where one supplier is 
better off without making the other supplier worse off.  A detailed discussion of Pareto 
optimality is given in [26], while [6] develops Pareto optimal solutions for optimising 
system reliability when uncertainties exist in component reliabilities.  
  
3.3 Shapley Value to Support Trading  
 A characteristic of a Pareto optimal solution is that marginal rate of substitution 
for fixed profit level (i.e. the derivative of the expected reliability programme cost 
function with respect to target reliability) is the same for each supplier. Each problem 
can contain multiple allocations with this characteristic; we seek a method to determine 
a unique solution by generalising the concepts introduced in section 3.2 and developing 
a criterion to support the allocation of benefits derived from the co-operation between 
those suppliers who have agreed to form a coalition using the Shapley value.  This 
provides a measure of the contribution of each supplier towards a cooperative reliability 
strategy. 
 The Shapley value has its roots in cooperative game theory where it is reputedly 
the most studied and widely used single-valued solution concept [19]. Applications to 
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valuation cover a range of areas. Recent cases include environmental pollution cost 
allocation [20]; production decisions [16]; identification of drivers for customer 
satisfaction [7]; transportation problems [22]; optimal cartel size [21]; allocation of 
electricity transmission costs [14]; and insurance pricing [25]. There are no reported 
applications in reliability analysis. 
 Shapley [24] derived a formula for evaluating the contribution a player makes to 
the value of a cartel within a cooperative game. The formula is based on three axioms. 
Here we express these axioms in terms of our problem.  Hence organisations are the 
players, coalitions within the supply chain represent the cartel and value corresponds to 
the savings made through reallocation of reliability targets that are to be shared between 
organisations which form coalitions to trade targets: 
1. The savings attributed to the contribution of an organisation depends upon 
whether they belong to the coalition or not and not on the order in which it joined 
the coalition;  
2. The sum of the savings attributed to the individual organisations should equal the 
savings made within the coalition, with organisations making no contribution to 
the coalition being assigned zero value; 
3. There is no expected gain or loss for an organisation in delaying trade at any given 
decision point.    
 For the case of a 2 supplier chain, only one coalition is possible. For the general 
case of a supply chain comprising more than two organisations, many possible different 
coalitions could be formed ranging from one coalition comprising all suppliers to many 
coalitions containing a few suppliers. We assume that the number of organisations 
joining a coalition will be specified a priori and is denoted by N . The marginal 
savings each organisation generates to a coalition depends upon the size of that 
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coalition. Let Z  denote the set of organisations in a coalition prior to organisation i 
joining. The saving arising from the inclusion of the ith organisation in a coalition of 
size N  has been shown by [24] to be given by the Shapley value: 
( ) { }( ) ( )! 1 !
!i Z N i
Z N Z
Z i Z
N
φ υ υ
⊆ −
− − ⎡ ⎤= ∪ −⎣ ⎦∑      (1) 
where: 
{ }( )
( )
  is the savings of the coalition of  organisations and organisation
is the savings of the coalition of  organisations
Z and represent the number of elements in the sets  and  respectively
Z i Z  i
Z  Z
N Z N
υ
υ
∪
 
Thus Shapley value is essentially a weighted average of the marginal savings 
organisation i  makes to a coalition, averaged over all possible points of entry into the 
coalition.  That is, first, second and so on.  The weights measure the probability that a 
coalition of size Z is formed prior to supplier i joining, assuming a purely random 
distribution of joining sequences. A detailed discussion is given in [17]. 
 
4. Example Application of Trading Method 
The proposed method has not been applied in practice; hence we develop an 
illustrative example that builds upon our experience of reliability modelling during the 
development of aerospace products [28]. 
Consider a system with four sub-systems, each supplied by different 
organisations. All four sub-systems must work for the system to operate and each fails 
independently of the others.  The target reliability for the system is 0.73 where 
reliability is measured as the probability of successful operation at 100 time units. 
Targets allocated to suppliers 1 through 4 are 0.95, 0.95, 0.95 and 0.85 respectively.  
While these targets are negotiable, the system target is fixed. 
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Sections 4.1 to 4.3 explain the implementation of the proposed approach. In 
section 4.1 we show how the process is initiated by estimating the sub-system 
reliabilities and selecting the activities within the programmes for each individual 
supplier.  In section 4.2 we explore whether there are less costly allocations of reliability 
between suppliers that will meet system targets.  If so, we identify the optimal 
allocations and use Shapley’s value to share the cost savings between those suppliers 
who agree to trade as shown in section 4.3. 
 
4.1 Model for Reliability and Allocation of Activities in Individual Organisations 
The model proposed by [13] is used to explicate the relationship between the reliability 
of the system, or sub-system, design and the reliability activities to which it can be 
exposed.  The model assumes the design has enumerable failure modes that will result 
in failure in operation if not corrected. The purpose of the reliability activities is to 
detect these failure modes or confirm whether or not they exist. Each activity may 
provide information on many failure modes, although not necessarily all.  
 [13] show that the reliability of a system at time t exposed to a portfolio of 
activities can be written as: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )∏∏ ∏
∀ ∀ ∀ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−=
i j k
ijkijiS
ikptRtR δλ 111       (2) 
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( )
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  th supplier
  th potential failure mode
 reliability function of the th supplier
 subjective probability th potential failure mode of th supplie
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R t i
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=
=
=
=
= r exists 
th activity
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ijk
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δ
=
=
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 Since the exact number of failure modes and the actual effect of an activity upon 
a failure mode are not known, probabilities measuring the likelihood of each of these 
events can be elicited through structured expert judgement.  Historical failure data, for 
example from heritage systems or generic databases, can be used to provide estimates of 
the time to realisation of failure modes in operation. 
The target reliability can be stated in terms of the reliability function. Typically, 
the objective is to minimise costs, while satisfying the required target reliability and 
completion of the programme within specified calendar project duration.  Assuming all 
activities will be conducted sequentially then [13] have shown that solving the 
following integer programming problem will give an optimal portfolio of activities:  
 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 01 1 1 ikS i ij ijk
i j k
R t R t p R
δδ λ
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⎡ ⎤= − − − ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∏∏ ∏      (3) 
0ik ik
k i
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∀ ∀
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where: 
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4.2 Instantiation of Reliability and Cost Models with Data  
Tables 1 and 2 summarise data from each of the four suppliers, 1, 2,3,4i = .  
For the corresponding sub-system, Table 1 lists the potential failure modes and 
the probabilities that the j th failure mode for the i th supplier will be realised in 
operation ( ijλ ), assuming the current design remains unchanged. The sets of failure 
modes for each sub-system are assumed mutually exclusive. This is not unreasonable 
given one organisation will be required to take responsibility for addressing a particular 
issue. 
 The time to realise a potential failure mode can be modelled by a probability 
distribution. In Table 1, we express this as the empirical survival probability for the j th 
failure mode of the i th sub-system at 100 time units for the particular failure mode, 
( )100ijR .  There are no constraints on the expression of the probability distribution and 
the method supports both parametric and nonparametric approaches. 
 Each organisation selects relevant reliability activities. These sets of activities 
may be overlapping between organisations, although for this example we have assumed 
they are unique to an organisation.  The subjective probabilities that the k th activity 
may remove the failure mode j th failure mode of the i th sub-system, ijkp , are given 
for all combinations in Table 1.  
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 The cost of the k th each activity for the i th supplier, ikC , (in standardised 
monetary units) can be estimated from, for example, person-effort for implementation 
and are given for each activity for each supplier in Table 2. 
   
INSERT TABLE 1 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Table 3 presents the sub-system reliability estimates and the expected cost of 
meeting targets through selected activities based upon implementation of the model 
described in section 4.1 for each independent organisation.  This shows that activities 
costing 360 units require to be conducted by four suppliers in order to meet the system 
target and represents the default situation.  The total costs obtained through pooling all 
four suppliers together to meet system reliability requirements regardless of individual 
reliability targets is 200.  We propose using Shapley’s Value to divide the 120 savings 
amongst the four suppliers.  This is discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
4.3 Computing the Shapley Value to Support Trading between Coalitions 
Assessing the contribution made by a particular supplier requires computation of  
their marginal contribution on joining the coalition.  Intuitively, the marginal 
contribution, relative to the other suppliers, will decrease the later a supplier joins the 
coalition.  Therefore we consider the marginal benefit of all possible joining sequences, 
so that the share of one supplier is not influenced by the sequence in which 
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organisations join the coalition.  The results of the analysis using the methods 
developed in section 3 are summarised in Table 4. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
Table 4 shows the 12 possible coalitions from the 4 suppliers. For example, say 
suppliers 1 and 2 already form a coalition, { }1, 2Z = , then they may be joined by 
supplier 3 giving the set { } { }1, 2,3Z i∪ = .  In summary, the rows in Table 4 correspond 
to the possible coalitions of none, 2, 3 or 4 organisations.  
For each coalition, the total cost of the programme that will meet system 
reliability targets at minimum cost is computed using equation (3) given in section 4.1.  
The total cost for the default case of no coalition is 360 as before.  For convenience, we 
do not carry any information in Table 4 about the activities to be undertaken, although 
such a list can be produced for all suppliers under all coalition combinations following 
the example of Table 3.  
The marginal contributions of each supplier involved in a coalition can be 
obtained by computing the value of the supplier to the coalition.  For example, the value 
of supplier 1 to the coalition { }1, 2  is 50 monetary units corresponding to the saving 
360-310 monetary units.  Similarly supplier 2 has a marginal contribution of 50 
monetary units to the coalition { }1, 2 .  As another example, consider a coalition of three 
suppliers.  If a fourth supplier joins the coalition then the marginal contributions are: 30 
monetary units (230-200) for supplier 1; 95 monetary units (295-200) for supplier 2; 65 
monetary units (265-200) for supplier 3; 5 monetary units (205-200) for supplier 4. 
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The weights allocated to each coalition measure the probability that a coalition 
of size Z is formed prior to the ith supplier joining. For example, the number of 
organisations is 4N = .  For the case of a coalition of all suppliers, 3Z =  represents 
the set of all suppliers less the ith organisation.  Hence the weight is computed by 
( )3! 4 3 1 ! 0.25
4!
− − = .  That is, randomly ordering the four suppliers implies a 25% 
chance that the ith organisation will join last.  Similarly when there is no coalition 
formed, the weight is 0.25. For all other cases, the weight equals one twelfth (0.083).  
This is a third of the weight allocated to the cases of no coalition and all suppliers 
forming a coalition and represents the three ways in which the i th supplier can join 
coalitions of two or three suppliers. 
The Shapley value is calculated using equation (4) as a weighted average of the 
marginal savings organisation i  makes to a coalition, averaged over all possible 
coalitions of different sizes within the supply chain. Therefore the expected share of the 
savings generated through the formation of the optimal coalition of all suppliers are 
found to be 26, 67, 49, 18 monetary units for suppliers 1 to 4 respectively.   
The results in Table 4 show that the most cost effective plan for the coalition 
between all four suppliers reduces the cost of the combined reliability programmes from 
360 to 200, saving 160 monetary units. This requires suppliers 1 and 3 to do no 
reliability development, supplier 2 to perform activity 1 and supplier 4 to perform 4 
activities (1, 2, 3, 4). The savings will be shared according to the Shapley values. 
Intuitively supplier 2 obtains the greatest share because the marginal contributions are, 
on average, highest as shown in Table 4; hence coalitions involving supplier 2 will 
generate the greatest savings. 
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 Figure 3 shows graphical analysis of the relationship between suppliers 1 and 4 
to illustrate some of the workings underpinning the results within Table 4.  Figure 3(a) 
shows points representing the set of activities where cost is minimised for a given target 
reliability for supplier 1.  Figure 3(b) shows the equivalent results for supplier 4. If 
suppliers 1 and 4 form a coalition then the possible combinations of the sets of activities 
for the two organisations are shown by the grey points in Figure 3(c).  The joint optimal 
set of activities for a given target reliability are denoted by the black points which 
bound the cluster of points as we might expect.  For example, the target reliability for a 
sub-system comprising the parts of suppliers 1 and 4 is 0.8075. Analysis of the data in 
the plot indicates that the minimum cost achievable by a coalition of suppliers 1 and 4 is 
150 monetary units. This constitutes a saving of 10 monetary units over the cost 
associated to these suppliers if they do not trade. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
 
5.  Conclusions and Further Work 
This paper has explored a mechanism for deriving a fair price for optimal 
allocation of reliability targets between suppliers by sharing information gained about 
potential failure modes through development and the costs of activities required to 
generate such information. The approach draws upon ideas proposed in the co-operative 
game theory literature.  An illustrative example demonstrates the feasibility of the 
approach under an initial set of assumptions.   
It is feasible to relax some assumptions made in the examples presented.  In the 
first example for the 2 supplier chain, we assumed constant failure rates to introduce 
basic concepts.  In the illustrative example we relaxed this assumption and considered a 
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target expressed as a reliability function at a specified time.  More generally, the model 
can be used with both parametric and nonparametric distributions.  
Similarly the examples consider a system that is configured as a series of 
subsystems provided by suppliers.  The use of the Shapley value is not restricted to this 
situation because it is used in conjunction with a model that explicates the relationship 
between the reliability of the system design and the reliability activities to which it can 
be exposed.  In the examples within this paper, the model used did assume a series 
structure.  This is not a requirement of the proposed trading mechanism as it could be 
developed for use with more complex models. 
The examples considered two simple situations with 2 or 4 organisations in the 
supply chain.  Hence N  was taken to equal 2 or 4 respectively.  There is no need to 
assume that a coalition will be formed by all organisations within the supply chain. 
Indeed practically this would not appear appropriate. The method can be applied where 
only subsets of suppliers agree to form such a coalition.  The only requirement of the 
approach is that the number of suppliers should be agreed prior to evaluation of the 
Shapley value.   
 There are limitations of the proposed approach and these require exploration 
through further research.  For example, we provide a means of allocating a fair share of 
the benefits of co-operation, assuming all organisations share information honestly.  
The motivation for this framework was generated through action research with 
the UK aerospace industry [26]. A further cycle of such research would allow ideas to 
be extended and validated practically. For example, service agreements may be 
expressed as availabilities requiring a means of combining reliability and supportability 
targets across suppliers.  This would require operational costs, as well as development 
costs, to be modelled through the trading mechanism.  
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Given the narrowness of the aerospace industry, supplier behaviour may be 
influenced by the knowledge that they will co-operate with others in future. Hence there 
is a need to examine the optimal strategic behaviour of organisations over different 
horizons and explore the consequences of games that might be played. For example, 
many political factors may affect collaboration hence different behavioural scenarios 
should be examined. 
The idea of trading reliability is an interesting issue.  This paper has sought to 
present a rationale mechanism for supporting such trade and sharing the financial 
benefits.  The approach is based on established theory and has been motivated by 
practical problems.  The approach would be equally valid intra as well as inter 
organisations. 
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Table 1  Input data on failure modes, activities and probabilities for each supplier   
a) Supplier 1 ( 1, 1,...,5, 1,...,6)i j k= = =  
Failure 
mode 
 
 
 
j  
Probability 
failure mode 
realised in 
operation 
 
ijλ  
Survival 
probability 
at 100 time 
units 
 
( )100ijR  
Probability failure mode j for supplier i  is 
realised through activity k  
 
 
 
ijkp  
   1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 0.1 0.9999 0.9 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 
2 0.5 0.9990 0.7 0.9 0 0.1 0.3 0.05 
3 0.2 0.9050 0.8 0.1 0 0 0.2 0.02 
4 0.1 0.9050 0.5 0.01 0.5 0 0.3 0.1 
5 0.6 0.9050 0.5 0 0 0.4 0.2 0.06 
 
b) Supplier 2 ( 2, 1,2, 1,2.i j k= = = ) 
 
j  
ijλ  ( )100ijR  ijkp  
   1 2 
1 0.5 0.3680 0.9 0.1 
2 0.3 0.9050 0.05 0.8 
 
c) Supplier 3 ( 3, 1,2, 1,2.i j k= = = ) 
 
j  
ijλ  ( )100ijR  ijkp  
   1 2 
1 0.3 0.9900 0.5 0.15 
2 0.2 0.9900 0.6 0.75 
 
 
d) Supplier 4 ( 4, 1,...,3, 1,...,8)i j k= = =  
 
j  
ijλ  ( )100ijR  ijkp  
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0.9 0.3680 0.1 0.05 0.2 0.3 0.5 0 0.75 0 
2 0.8 0.9050 0.3 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.003 0 0 0.01
3 0.75 0.9050 0.1 0.01 0.04 0.01 0 0.05 0 0.05
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Table 2  Input data on costs of activities for each supplier   
Supplier 
i  
Cost of activity 
ikC  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 100 10 5 25 30 50   
2 100 100       
3 10 20       
4 10 10 20 30 20 21 45 10 
 
 
Table 3 Reliability estimates, targets and expected activity costs when no coalitions 
Supplier 
 
 
i  
Target 
reliability 
 
0R  
Estimated 
design 
Reliability 
( )ˆ 100R  
Optimal set 
activities  
Expected activity 
costs 
1 0.95 0.92 4, 5 55 
2 0.95 0.66 1,2 200 
3 0.95 0.995 None 0 
4 0.85 0.37 1, 2, 5, 7 105 
System 0.73 0.22  360 
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Table 4  Share of savings to suppliers forming coalition computed using Shapley value 
Marginal contributions of each 
supplier 
{ }( ) ( )Z i Zυ υ⎡ ⎤∪ −⎣ ⎦  
 
Supplier 
coalition  
 
{ }Z i∪  
Total 
Cost 
 
ik
i k
C
∀ ∀
∑∑  
1i =  2i =  3i =  4i =  
Weight 
 ( )! 1 !
!
Z N Z
N
− −
 
 
None 360 0 0 0 0 0.25 
1,2 310 50 50   0.083 
1,3 305 55  55  0.083 
1,4 350 10   10 0.083 
2,3 260  100 100  0.083 
2,4 280  80  80 0.083 
3,4 330   30 30 0.083 
1,2,3 205 55 100 105  0.083 
1,3,4 295 35  55 10 0.083 
1,2,4 265 15 85  45 0.083 
2,3,4 230  100 50 30 0.083 
1,2,3,4 200 30 95 65 5 0.25 
Expected 
Share iφ  
 25.83 66.67 49.17 18.33  
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Expected 
Reliability 
Programme 
Costs 
Target Subsystem Failure Rate 
Figure 1  Indifference curves capturing trade-off between expected cost and 
reliability for one supplier at a different system profit level 
 
Profit level 1 
Profit level 2
Profit level 3
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AP1 
Total  
Expected 
Reliability 
Programme 
Costs 
System Failure Rate 
1Aµ  
1Bµ  
1Ac  
1Bc  
Figure 2(a)  Edgeware box for supplier A and B 
BP1 
AP1 
Total  
Expected 
Reliability 
Programme 
Costs 
System Failure Rate 
1A Sµ  
1B Sµ  
1A Sc  
1B Sc  
Figure 2(b)  Edgeware box with shift in failure rates and total savings 
BP1 
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2PB  
 
2PA  
 
2Bµ  
Total  
Expected 
Reliability 
Programme 
Costs 
System Failure Rate 
 
2Ac  
2Aµ  
2Bc  
Figure 2(c) Optimal allocation between supplier A and B  
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Figure 3(a) Cost of activity sets for target reliability for supplier 1 
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    Figure 3(b) Costs of activity sets for target reliability for supplier 4 
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    Figure 3(c) All possible (grey) and optimal (black) sets of activities for coalition 
between suppliers 1 and 4. 
 
